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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court recently decided Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,' a case where the plaintiff, an associate

justice candidate on the Minnesota Supreme Court, challenged the announce clause of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. 2 The an1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. Id. at 768-70.
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nounce clause forbade all judicial candidates from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues during their campaigns.
The Court determined that the announce clause violated the plaintiff's
First Amendment right to free speech.4 The Supreme Court's ruling
will likely have a large impact on states throughout the country because the majority of states, including Texas, use some form of electoral process to fill at least some of their judicial seats.5 Likewise, many
of those states regulate judicial candidates' speech with provisions
similar to Minnesota's announce clause.6 Therefore, this decision is
likely to cause judicial elections in Texas, and elsewhere, to become
more like legislative and executive elections.7 This decision will likely
make the line less clear as to the differences between the branches of
government. 8
White may not produce only negative outcomes. A positive outcome from this decision is that it may increase the desire in citizens to
amend the Texas Constitution, which provides for judicial elections, to
allow for a different process for filling the judicial benches in Texas.9
Such a change will likely bring better-qualified persons to serve on the
benches in Texas. 10 The Texas Legislature and Texas citizens should
respond to the gag being lifted on judicial candidates by removing
their gags and demanding a constitutional amendment eliminating the
judicial election process and opting for a better system to ensure better-qualified candidates are sitting on the bench.
This Note begins by examining the facts of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.I l Second, it examines the history of the judicial election system in Texas.12 Third, it examines the development of the
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct and compares the American Bar Association's (ABA) past and current judicial codes with the Texas coun3. Id. at 768. Minnesota's announce clause provides, "A candidate for a judicial
office, including an incumbent judge.., shall not.., announce his or her views on
MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon
disputed legal or political issues .....
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (Supp. 2003).

4. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
5. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive

JudicialSelections Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 273,
277 (2002). For a state-by-state listing of how each state fills its judicial seats, see id. at
app. 314-60.
6. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Campaigns in the Shadow of Republican

Party of Minnesota v. White, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 2, 2.
7. See Brief of Ad Hoc Committee of Former Justices and Friends Dedicated to
an Independent Judiciary as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents Supporting
Affirmance at 9-14, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01521).
8. See Cathy R. Silak & Aaron C. Charrier, The Future of Judicial Elections:A
Campaign Commission Proposal,39 IDAHO L. REV. 357, 367-68 (2003).
9. See Rotunda, supra note 6, at 23.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol10/iss1/12
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terparts. 13 Fourth, the Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision1 4
and discusses the ramifications the White ruling will likely have on the

judicial election process in Texas. 5 Finally, this Note discusses possible alternatives to the electoral process in an effort to respond to the
likely 16ramifications of White as well as improve the judiciary in
Texas.

II.

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE

A.

The Facts

The facts of the White case are all too common in states utilizing
judicial elections.17 In the 1996 election for a Minnesota Supreme
Court associate justice position, Gregory Wersal distributed pam-

phlets criticizing the Minnesota Supreme Court's past decisions on

several issues, including crime, welfare, and abortion.1 8 Shortly thereafter, the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility received a
complaint against Wersal charging that the materials he distributed
violated the announce clause, 19 which prohibits a judicial candidate
from announcing his views on disputed legal or political issues.20 The
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, which investi-

gates ethics claims, dismissed the complaint because (1) it doubted

that the announce clause was constitutional2 1 and (2) it doubted it
could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the campaign

materials constituted Wersal's announcements of his views on the
three issues. 22 Due to the fear of further complaints being filed
against him, Wersal withdrew from the 1996 election.2 3
Wersal once again sought election for the same office in 1998.24 For

this election, he first sought an advisory opinion from the Minnesota
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board as to whether the prohibi13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part VI.
17. See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir. 1993)
(circulating campaign literature declaring he had not written an opinion reversing a
rape conviction); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 139 (3d Cir. 1991) (contending that the prohibition of announcing views impeded his ability to campaign); In
re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 91 (Fla. 2003) (commenting on pending criminal cases not
likely to come before the judicial candidate in court); Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Ky. 1994) (advertising his stance on abortion).
18. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
19. See id. at 768-69.

20.

MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT

Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1993).

21. See White, 536 U.S. at 769.
22. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 973 (D. Minn. 1999),
affd, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
23. Id.
24. White, 536 U.S. at 769.
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tion found in the announce clause would be enforced.2 5 The board
refused to answer his request because he had not given the board a list
of announcements he planned to make.2 6 The board again reiterated
its doubt as to the constitutionality of the "announce clause."2 7 When
Wersal did provide examples to the board, it declined to give an advisory opinion because he had already filed suit in the federal district
court against the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, the Chair of the board, and others.2 8 Wersal challenged
the constitutionality of the announce clause as a violation of the First
Amendment free speech provision.2 9
B.

The Decision of the District Court

Wersal also sought an injunction in district court preventing enforcement of the announce clause. 30 The district court held that the
announce clause did not violate the freedom of speech provision in
the First Amendment.3 1 The court held that the announce clause
served the need to "maintain[ ] the actual and apparent integrity and
independence of its judiciary. ' 32 The court further stated that the voters had other means to obtain information about the judicial candidates rather than through the candidates' statements about their views
on legal issues.3 3 As a limitation to its holding, the court stated that
the announce clause reached only disputed issues likely to come
before the court in which the candidate was seeking election.34 With
this holding's limitation, prohibiting a judicial candidate's announcement of political issues that never come before his court violates the
candidate's right to free speech.3 5
C.

The Decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

On appeal brought by Wersal, the Eighth Circuit applied the strict
scrutiny test to determine the constitutionality of the announce
clause.36 The strict scrutiny test requires that the party seeking to uphold the law show that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compel25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 769 n.2.
29. Id. at 769-70.
30. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (D. Minn. 1999),
affd, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
31. See id. at 986.
32. Id. at 980.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 986.
35. See id.
36. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 864 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub
nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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ling state interest.3 7 The appellate court began its analysis by
classifying the speech prohibited by the announce clause as political
speech.3 8 Citing the United States Supreme Court, the appellate court
stated, "[f]reedom of speech reaches its high-water mark in the context of political expression. Debate about the qualification of candidates for public office is at the core of our First Amendment
freedoms."3 9 The court backtracked by stating that a state can regulate a judicial candidate's behavior and speech during elections, however, because the judicial branch is fundamentally different from the
legislative and executive branches of government. 41 The judicial candidates' roles are different because legislators and executives deal
with policy decided by majority vote; popularity is their business. 4 '
However, "in litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined
by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to

unpopularity. "42
In applying the strict scrutiny test, the appellate court recognized
43
that the announce clause burdened the First Amendment. Ultimately the court concluded that the clause did not violate a judicial
candidate's freedom of speech because the announce clause is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 44 The court identified the following as compelling state interests: (1) "an independent
and impartial judiciary;" (2) "preserving public confidence in that independence and impartiality;" and (3) ensuring the appearance of judicial impartiality.4 5 In deciding that these were compelling interests,
the court further concluded that the restriction of the announce clause
was necessary to further such interests because it "prevents candidates
from implying how they would decide cases that might come before
them as judge. '46 The restriction also prevents litigants and the public
from losing faith in the judge's decisions and the judicial system as a
whole because it prevents a judge from appearing as though he has
already decided a case from his campaign statements rather than deciding a case on its facts and merits.4 7 In addition, the court stated
37. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989); see also
White, 536 U.S. at 774-75.
38. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 861-62.
39. Id. at 861.
40. See id. at 862 (citing Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir.
1991)).
41. White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864.
44. See id. at 883.
45. Id. at 867.
46. Id. at 877; see also id. at 881-82 (accepting the district court's limited interpretation that the announce clause reaches only disputed issues likely to come before the
candidate if elected and further construing the clause to allow candidates to generally
discuss case law and judicial philosophy).
47. Id. at 878.
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that the judge may improperly decide cases because he has announced
his view on the issue during his campaign.4 8 The court was concerned
that judges would improperly decide cases because they feared not
being reelected when they did not stick with their views as expressed
during their campaign.49
D.

The Decision of the United States Supreme Court

With several circuit courts split5 ° as to whether the announce clause
violated the Constitution's freedom of speech guarantee, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and recently handed down its
decision.5 1 In analyzing the clause's constitutionality, it, like the
Eighth Circuit, applied the strict scrutiny test rather than a less burdensome test because political speech is at the core of the First
Amendment's protections.52 Although both the Eighth Circuit and
the Supreme Court applied the same test, the results were very
different.5 3
The Supreme Court first set out to decide the meaning of "impartiality" because the Eighth Circuit held that ensuring impartiality in the
judicial system is a compelling state interest,54 but it failed to provide
the meaning of such word.55 The Supreme Court defined "impartiality" as the "lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding."' 56 With that meaning in mind, it concluded that the announce
clause is not narrowly tailored to serve impartiality, much less the appearance of impartiality, because the regulation does not prohibit
"speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or
against particular issues."' 57 Therefore, when that particular issue in
which the judge announced his view during his campaign comes
before the judge, the party taking the opposite side of that position
taken by the judge is likely to be defeated. 58 Defeat occurs not because of a bias the judge has against that party, the Court explained,
but because "[a]ny party taking that position is just as likely to lose."5 9
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 857 (holding the announce clause constitutional); Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the announce clause unconstitutional); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding the
announce clause constitutional).
51. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
52. See id. at 774.
53. See id. at 775-77; Kelly, 247 F.3d at 857.
54. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867.
55. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 776.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 777.
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Such an interest, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, is not a compelling
state interest.6 °
The Court also rejected Respondent's argument that the announce
clause serves an interest in a judge's open-mindedness, or at least the
appearance of such, because the clause relieves pressure from a judge
to rule a certain way in order to be consistent with prior statements
made during his election campaign.6 1 The Court concluded that statements made during election campaigns are too minute to warrant the
drastic effects of the announce clause.6" The effects of the announce
clause allow a candidate for judicial office to state his views of disputed legal or political issues all the way up until he declares he is
running in a judicial election.6 3 Upon being elected to the bench, the
judge can once again state his views on the same disputed legal or
political issues all the way up until his next election.64 Because the
clause prohibits judges and candidates from making announcements
only at certain times and in certain forms, the announce clause, the
Court concluded, is "woefully underinclusive" and therefore does not
pursue either the objectives of open-mindedness or even the appearance of open-mindedness.6 5
Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's decision that both impartiality and the appearance of impartiality were
compelling state interests, 66 it held, in a five-to-four decision, that the
announce clause in the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial
conduct did not pass the strict-scrutiny test 67 and thus violated the
First Amendment's free speech clause. 6 8 As such, many states with
similar provisions will find themselves in the same situation as Minnesota-unable to prohibit judicial candidates from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues.6 9

60. See id.
61. Id. at 778-79.
62. Id. at 779.
63. See id. at 779-80.
64. See id. Besides regulating a judicial candidate's announcements on disputed
political or legal issues, the only other time that a judge's speech on disputed issues is
regulated is when that particular issue is pending before his court. See id. Otherwise,
while a judge, he may announce his views on disputed political or legal issues in published articles or speeches. See id.; MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4(B)
(Supp. 2003).
65. See White, 536 U.S. at 779-80.
66. See id. at 775-77.
67. See id. at 781.
68. See id. at 788.
69. See id. at 786 (stating that only four of the thirty-one states using the electoral
process do not have an announce clause prohibiting the announcement of views of
disputed political and legal issues).
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THE HISTORY OF TEXAS JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

A.

The Provisions of Texas Constitutions

Like Minnesota and thirty other states,7 ° judges in Texas are chosen
by way of public elections. 71 Texas has not always used the general
election system to fill judicial vacancies, and in early Texas history, the
question of how judges would be chosen was in a great state of turmoil.72 Beginning with the Constitution of the Republic, judicial positions in the Texas Supreme Court were filled by a joint-ballot election

of the House of Representatives and Senate. 73 The Texas Constitu-

tion of 1845, following the United States Constitution, changed the
process by providing that the governor, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, would appoint the justices who would serve a six-year
term. 4 It was not until 1850, with an amendment to the Constitution

of 1845, that Texas began using the general election system to select its
judges. 75 Only eleen years later, the Constitution of 1861 was created, and it, like the Constitution of 1845, provided that with the advice and consent of the Senate, the governor would appoint the
supreme court justices. 76 The Constitution of 1866 returned to the
general election system for selection of supreme court justices,7 7 and
in 1869 it was amended once again to appointment by the governor.78
Finally, the Constitution of 1876 provided that supreme court justices
would be chosen by general election, and it remains a system of election to this date.7 9

Like the Texas Supreme Court, all other courts in Texas use the
same electoral process in selecting judges.80 Because the Texas Court
70. States implementing the judicial electoral process to fill at least some of their
judicial seats include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at app. 314-60.
71. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(c), 4(a), 6(b), 7, 15.
72. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2; TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. IV, § 5; TEX. CONST. of
1861, art. IV, § 5; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 5.
73. REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 9, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE
LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1069, 1074 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898); see also
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
74. See TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 5; see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp.
commentary (Vernon 1993).
75. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 5 (1850); see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
76. TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. IV, § 5; see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
77. TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. IV, § 2; see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
78. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, § 2 (1873); see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp.
commentary (Vernon 1993).
79. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2(c).
80. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(c), 4(a), 6(b), 7, 15, 18(a).
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of Criminal Appeals, the highest court for criminal cases, and the
Texas Court of Appeals, previously the Court of Civil Appeals, were
not established until 1891, the justices on their benches have always
been elected.8 As with the Texas Supreme Court, the district courts
originated from the Constitution of the Republic.82 Its selection process followed that of the Supreme Court. 83 Furthermore, the constitution now in effect provides that county court judges
and Justices of the
84
Peace are selected by popular election as well.
There is an exception to judicial elections in Texas. 85 The constitution provides that the governor shall fill any vacancies in the Supreme
Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, Court of Appeals, and District
Courts until the following general election.8 6 Should there be a vacancy in a County Judge or Justice of the Peace office, the Commissioners' Court in that county appoints a judge until the next general
election.87 This appointment is known as a vacancy of term and not a
vacancy of office because the appointed judge holds the office for the
unexpired term of the predecessor.88 At the end of that term the appointed judge must run for election and be elected by the voters to
remain on the bench. 89
B.

PartisanshipElections

Although Minnesota and Texas use the electoral system to fill at
least some judicial seats, the two states conduct elections and campaigns differently. 9° As previously mentioned, Minnesota's judicial
elections are nonpartisan, 91 which is how the majority of states using
the electoral process conduct their elections. 92 However, Texas is a
81. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 4 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
82. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993); REPUB. TEX.
CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS
1822-1897, at 1069, 1073 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).
83. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7; TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, § 6; TEX. CONST. of
1866, art. IV, § 5; TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. IV, § 6; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 6
(1850); TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 6; REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 9,
reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1069, 1074 (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1898); see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7 interp. commentary
(Vernon 1993) (describing evolution of Texas district courts).
84. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18(a).
85. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28(a).
86. Id.
87. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28(b).
88. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
89. See TEX. CONST. art V, § 28(a).
90. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 277 nn.14-15 (stating Texas's judicial elections are partisan and Minnesota's judicial elections are nonpartisan).
91. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
92. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 277. Nonpartisan election states include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 277 n.15.
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state that uses partisan-ballot elections.93 Although partisan-ballot

elections in judicial elections are not required by the state's constitution, Texas election laws implicitly encourage judicial candidates to
run on a partisan ballot.94 With such encouragement, Texas has used

this process for over 100 years.95
C.

Texas's Attempt to Move Away from Judicial Elections

In the 1970s, there was an attempt to rewrite the Texas Constitution
by moving away from the process of electing judges.9 6 Some members
of the state's judiciary proposed a merit selection retention election

process for judges.9 7 However, the proposal has now disappeared

from the Republican Party of Texas's platform which first called for
the change. 98 As a party, the Republicans have switched sides and are
now against the merit selection process, 99 possibly because most

judges now sitting on the bench are Republicans. 10 Ted Royer,
spokesman for the Texas GOP, stated, "The vast majority of Texas
Republicans are staunchly opposed to this system because it takes
away their right to elect their judges." 10 1 Still, some, including a minority of Republicans, would like to see a change take place. 10 2 For

example, in 1995, the Texas Supreme Court justices stated in an opinion that the "[c]ourt has unanimously supported efforts to reform ju93. Symposium, Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform, 33 U. TOL. L.
REV. 335, 346 (2002); see Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 277 n.14 (stating that
states conducting partisan elections include: Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia).
94. Susan G. Douglass, Comment, Selection and Discipline of State Judges in
Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 672, 674-75 (1977). The judicial candidate who does not run
in the party primary race cannot run on the official ballot in the general election
"unless the candidate meets a rigorous independent candidate requirement," which
requires the candidate, among other things, to have a petition signed by persons who
did not vote in the party primary election, and the number of signatures must total
one percent of the total vote received by all candidates for the governor position in

the last gubernatorial election.

Id. at 674; see also TEx.

ELEC. CODE

ANN.

§§ 142.001-.010 (Vernon 1986) (setting forth the requirements for an independent
candidate to be placed on the general election ballot).
95. See Symposium, supra note 93, at 346.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Anthony Champagne & Kyle Cheek, The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a Case Study, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 913-14 (2002) (discussing
the merit system proposal made by Chief Justice John Hill who offered to lead the
movement for judicial reform which led to strife among members of the court).
98. Symposium, supra note 93, at 346.

99. See Max B. Baker, Outlook Bleak for Judge Bill, FORT

WORTH STAR-TELE-

May 25, 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Baker, Outlook Bleak].
100. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys et al., Republicans Rule: The Candidacy of Gov.
George W. Bush Helps Republicans in Texas Judiciaryand DA Races, TEX. LAW., Nov.
13, 2000, at 1.
101. See Baker, Outlook Bleak, supra note 99, at 6.
102. See Symposium, supra note 93, at 346; Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 884
(Tex. 1995).
GRAM,
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dicial elections in Texas. 1 °3 The court further stated that the
legislature has "failed to respond" to such reform proposals.'0 4 Also,
as recently as the 2002 election campaign, Chief Justice Thomas Phillips reported that one of his priorities, if reelected, was to convince the
state legislature to allow voters to choose a "better way to select
judges."1 5 Since his reelection, Chief Justice Phillips has acted as
promised and "stumped for judicial election reform before a joint session of the Legislature.' 0 6 It appeared his push for reform was making headway because the Senate passed Senate Bill 794, which would
allow voters to decide whether to amend the state's constitution to
allow the governor to appoint, with the senate's confirmation, the justices on the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. 10 7 Following the justices' term, Texas voters would then vote
on whether to retain the justices. 0 8 Upon receipt of the bill from the
Senate, the state's House of Representatives then referred it to the
Judicial Affairs Committee. 10 9 No further action was taken, and as a
result, upon the end of the legislative session on June 2, 2003, the bill
died in the house." 0 Until Chief Justice Phillips can obtain more support for the reform, Texas will continue to have partisan judicial
elections.
D.

A More Active Texas Judicial Campaign Process

Although there have been constitutional provisions for judicial elections in Texas since 1876, judges were not widely known except in the
legal community, and judicial campaigns remained quite "sleepy" until the late 1970s. 111 However, the partisanships of judges have played
12
a major role in both the "sleepy" times and the more recent times.
One scholar attributes those quiet campaign days to Texas being a
primarily Democratic state." 3 Prior to the 1970s, most judges were
appointed to the bench by a Democratic governor, and it was rare for
these Democratic judges to have opponents at election time." 4 Many
judges resigned mid-term, which allowed the governor to appoint an103. Rogers, 909 S.W.2d at 884.
104. Id.
105. Max B. Baker, 2002 Tarrant County Voters Guide, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 28, 2002, at F10 [hereinafter Baker, Voters Guide].
106. Max B. Baker, Groups Push for Judicial Reform, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 21, 2003, at B1.
107. See Tex. S.B. 794, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
108. Id.
109. See H.J. OF TEX., 78th Leg., R.S. 2101 (2003).
110. Tex. S.B. 794, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
111. See Anthony Champagne, Modern Judicial Campaigns, THE JUDGES' J., Summer 2002, at 17, 17-18 [hereinafter Champagne, Campaigns].
112. Symposium, supra note 93, at 346.
113. See id.
114. See id.; Champagne & Cheek, supra note 97, at 909-10.
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other Democratic judge." 5 "This arrangement was so common in the
first 100 years of the 1876 constitution that one study concluded that
the Texas judicial selection system was primarily appointive.""' 6
The late 1970s brought a change of ideals and views to Texas, and
Democratic judges began losing the votes to Republican judicial candidates. 117 With incumbent judges being faced with opponents, the
judicial campaigns began to liven up with large contributors, especially from special interest groups, and big-money media." 8 Plaintiffs'
lawyers hoped for less conservative judges with "pro-plaintiff philosophies" and began contributing large amounts of money to judicial
campaigns. 19 As evidenced by the 2002 election where there were
five places being vied for on the Texas Supreme Court, 12 ° the state's
12 1
judicial elections continue to be lively, popular, and contested.
IV.

THE HISTORY OF THE TEXAS JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT

With the use of the election process for filling judicial seats, a need
existed for rules in governing the judicial candidates' conduct during
their campaigns and elections. 122 The ABA passed the first code generally regulating judicial conduct in 1924.123 However, Texas did not
adopt any regulatory codes until 1964.124 The Texas Canons were
adopted, not to be enforced by a committee against state judges, but
1 25
only to be a set of guidelines that judges should aspire to follow.
Even as early as 1964, the Texas Canons of Judicial Conduct contained
an announce clause directed toward judicial candidates, which provided that "[a] candidate for judicial position should not .. . announce
in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class
115. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 97, at 909.
116. Id. at 910.
117. Id.
118. Champagne, Campaigns, supra note 111, at 17.
119. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 97, at 911.
120. See Baker, Voters Guide, supra note 105, at 10F-11F.
121. Thomas R. Phillips, Time Has Come to Reform Judicial Selection System,
Hous. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 10, 11-12. For example, voters in Harris County's
general election voted for forty-three judicial contests, and the candidates sought
votes via radio, television, billboards, direct mail and telephone contacts. Furthermore, "[c]andidates avidly sought endorsements from civic organizations, newspapers
and political and issue groups. Six-figure campaign budgets were not uncommon for
courts handling tort cases." Id.
122. See Brief of Ad Hoc Committee of Former Justices and Friends Dedicated to
an Independent Judiciary as Amicus Curae in Support of Respondents at 10, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).
123. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002); PATRICK M.
MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 86
(1990).
124. See TEX. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS, 27 TEX. B.J. (Supp. 1964, superseded
1974).
125. J. David Rowe, Note, A ConstitutionalAlternative to the ABA's Gag Rules on
Judicial Campaign Speech, 73 TEX. L. REV. 598, 599-600 (1995).
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support, and he should do nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with bias, partialprovision mirrored the
ity or improper discrimination.' 1 26 This
27
ABA's canon passed forty years earlier.
Shortly after Texas passed its canons, the ABA adopted the 1972
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which was designed to address the
problems of 1924's set of canons. 128 One significant change was the
ability to enforce the regulations by developing a committee to investigate complaints and discipline the judges for not following the canons' regulations. 12 9 The Model Code, now considered substantive
law of judicial ethics, continued to regulate activities of candidates for
judicial office, and its announce clause provided that a judicial candidate "should not.., announce his views on disputed legal or political
issues .
,,.30 Shortly thereafter, the Texas Supreme Court also
adopted a new version, entitled the Code of Judicial Conduct.1 3 ' This,
too, included provisions directed toward incumbent judges running for
the same anreelection as well as their opponents, which provided
13 2
nounce clause restriction as the ABA version.
In 1990, the ABA adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 133 and Texas, again, followed the ABA's lead by doing the same
in 1994.134 Due to concerns of the announce clause being too broad
and the constraints it might have on a judicial candidate's freedom of
speech, the ABA took a less restrictive approach.135 Its announce
clause was revised to read, and currently reads, as follows: "A candidate for judicial office ... shall not ... make statements that commit
or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies
or issues that are likely to come before the court.' 1 36 The 1994 Texas
version provides:
A judge or judicial candidate shall not make statements that indicate an opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial interpre126. TEX.
seded 1974).

CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS,

27 TEX. B.J. Canon 22(2) (Supp. 1964, super-

CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 30 (1924)).
MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 110-11 (1987).

127. See White, 536 U.S. at 786 (quoting
128. See

129. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraintand Liberty in Judicial Ethics,
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1065 (1996).
130. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972, superseded 1990).
131. See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, 37 TEX. B.J. 849 (1974, superseded 1994).
132. See id. at Canon 7(B)(1)(c).
133. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1990).
134. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, reprintedin Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G
app. B (Vernon 1998).
135. Katherine A. Moerke, Sacrificing Judicial Power on an Altar of Judicial Independence: Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 47, 52
(2001). In addition, the ABA has long opposed judicial elections in favor of the
merit-selection approach. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
787-88 (2002); see also MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(c)(2) cmt. (2000).
136. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990).

9
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tation by the office which is being sought or held, except that
discussion of an individual's judicial philosophy is appropriate if
conducted in a manner which does not suggest to
137a reasonable person a probable decision on any particular case.
This version of Texas's announce clause remained in effect from
1994 until 2002 when the United States Supreme Court held Minnesota's similar version to be unconstitutional. 3 8 The ruling has caused
many states, including Texas, to be in a quandary. 139 Less than two
months after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in White,
the Austin Division of the United States District Court was faced with
a similar case in which judicial candidate Steven Wayne Smith claimed
that Texas's announce clause was unconstitutional. 4 0 Smith filed suit
because he believed voters have a right to hear where candidates
stand on judicial philosophy and that "there is a need for issues to be
debated."''
The42 court held that the Texas announce clause was
unconstitutional.
The Texas Supreme Court further reacted to the White ruling.1 43 It
issued an order with several revisions, effective immediately, to the
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, which omitted Texas's version of the
announce clause. 1 44 The high court stated that the "immediacy of
pending elections requires that these amendments be undertaken
without the full and deliberate study the Court would ordinarily employ. ' 145 It was important to this court to provide guidelines to the
candidates who were then seeking election or reelection. 14 6 It also
appointed a committee to make further inquiries regarding the constitutionality of the canons regulating judicial campaigns.1 47 In a concurring statement, Justice Hecht reported he "remain[s] in doubt whether
[the revisions] are sufficient to comply with the First Amendment.' 1 48
137. TEX. CODE JUD.CONDUCT, Canon 5(1), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
tit. 2, subtit. G app. B (Vernon Supp. 2003).
138. See White, 536 U.S. at 788.
139. See Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful
Speech? Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L.
REV.

262, 289-94 (2003).

140. Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CV111JRN, slip op., 2002 WL 1870038, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2002, no pet. h.).
141. Tony Mauro, Court Considers Canon that Keeps Judicial Candidates Quiet,
TEX. LAW., Mar. 25, 2002, at 10.
142. Smith, 2002 WL 1870038 at *1.
143. See the Approval of Amendments to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct,
Misc. Docket No. 02-9167, in ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. HARDWICK,
HANDBOOK OF TEXAS LAWYER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, app. Q, 1466 (Texas Practice
Series vol. 48, 2002).
144. Id. at 1466-69.
145. Id. at 1466.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See the Statement of Justice Hecht Concurring in the Amendments to the
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Approved August 21, 2002, Misc. Docket No. 029167, in SCHUWERK & HARDWICK, supra note 142, at 1470.
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V.
A.

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF
MINNESOTA V. WHIT.i

Lessening the Gap Between the Judicial,Executive, and
Legislative Branches

"The Supreme Court has thrown the fat in the fire" by allowing
candidates for judicial office to announce their views on disputed legal
and political issues."' With this recent ruling, it appears that the Supreme Court has forgotten that the judicial branch is different from
the legislative and executive branches.150 It appears to have forgotten
that impartiality and independence are important characteristics required of judges. 151 These attributes are not required of the executive
1 52
and legislative branches because they serve as representatives.
Such distinctions between the branches are evident in constitutional
provisions, which are unique to the judiciary and "accommodate the
choice of popular selection with the constitutional value of judicial
independence. 1 53 For example, Texas's high court judicial terms are
longer than other elected officials; only judges are subject to both impeachment and special disciplinary process; only judges are subject to
a mandatory age requirement; and only judges are subject to training
and/or experience requirements.1 5 4 With such differences, it is suggested that Texans did not want judicial elections to be like other elections. 155 The Supreme Court, however, seems to have ignored such
differences and the desires of citizens and has placed all three
branches on the same footing-making judicial
campaigns compara1 56
ble to executive and legislative campaigns.
B.

Increase in Litigation

As a result of this decision, provisions of the Texas Code of Judicial
Conduct, along with the ABA's Model Code and the codes of other
states, will likely be challenged on the same constitutional grounds as
'
the announce clause, including "the pledge and promises clause." 157
The Supreme Court declined to address the pledges and promises
clause which is found in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct be149. Terry Carter, Boosting the Bench: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Is Spending
Big Bucks to Influence Judicial Elections, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 32-33 (quoting
ABA President Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.).
150. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803-06 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 805-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153. Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief Justices in Support of Respondents at 6, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).
154. Id. at 6-7, nn.6-9.
155. See Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, CT. REV.,
Winter 1998, at 8, 10 (2002).
156. See id. at 8-11.
157. See id. at 9.
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cause the clause was not at issue. 158 However, the White ruling will
impact this clause as well.' 5 9 Like Minnesota 160 and the ABA Model
Code,'61 Texas has a pledges and promise clause, which provides that
"[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not make pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of
the duties of the office ...
162 One scholar opines that "[i]f judicial
commissions apply the pledges and promises clause as broadly as the
Minnesota commission interpreted its announce clause, it will suffer a
similar constitutional fate."1'63
Under the analysis taken by the Supreme Court, which claimed the
announce clause did not prohibit speech for or against a particular
party, the pledges and promises clause, likewise, does not prohibit a
promise to rule for or against a particular party or class of cases." 6
Therefore, the pledges and promises clause is likely to be held unconstitutional because it, in effect, silences a judicial candidate about all
pledges and promises except to be faithful and impartial in his performance of his duties. 65 Even if the pledges and promises clause is
constitutional, the clause now has very little value because of the decision in White.166 Allowing a judicial candidate to announce his view
on a disputed legal or political issue will, in effect, allow a judge 167
to
make a promise as to how he will determine a specific type of case. 168
This promise is merely disguised as an announcement of his views.
As Michael J. Hencke, Co-Chair of the ABA Section's Task Force on
the Judiciary notes, "After all, is there really any difference between
saying, 'I am an abortion opponent,"' which is now allowed because
of the White ruling, "and saying 'I promise to invalidate laws that permit abortion'?,"
which is still prohibited by the pledges and promises
1 69
clause.

158. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
159. See Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 39 CT. REV., SPRING 2002, at 12, 13-14.
160. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (Supp. 2003).
161. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(d)(ii) (1990).
162. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(2)(i) reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
tit. 2, subtit. G app. B (Vernon Supp. 2003).
163. Baran, supra note 158, at 13.
164. Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993); see also
Bradley S. Clanton, Supressing Speech in JudicialElections: How the Canons of Judicial Ethics Abridge the Freedom of Speech of Judges and Candidatesfor Judicial Office, 21 Miss. C. L. REV. 267, 289 (2002).
165. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228; see Clanton, supra note 163, at 289.
166. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 819 (2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
167. See Amy J. Longo, Minnesota's "Announce Clause" Held Unconstitutional:Supreme Court Enlarges Scope of Permissible Speech by Judicial Candidates, LITIG.
NEWS, Nov. 2002, at 2, 2 (quoting Michael J. Henke, Co-Chair of the ABA Section's
Task Force on the Judiciary).
168. See id.
169. Id.
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In addition, should the pledges and promises clause be upheld,
more litigation will ensue between judicial candidates. 7 ° Disputes
will arise as to whether a statement made by a candidate is an announcement of his views or a pledge to act a certain way while in
office, because reasonable minds may differ as to whether the candidate's statements were pledges or merely announcements of his
views. 17 ' For example, in 2001, as a result of campaign literature stating, "I'm very tough on crimes where there are victims who have been
physically harmed ....
I have no feelings for the criminal," a judge
received a public warning because the Texas Commission on Judicial
Conduct believed such statements were a pledge "not to show leniency toward violent criminals.' 1 72 With questions of whether statements made by judicial candidates are merely announcements or cross
the line and are promises, opposing candidates will seek answers from
the Judiciary Committee, thus taking away from the committee time
1 73
they need to investigate and discipline other judicial misconduct.
C. Forced Announcements by Judicial Candidates
Another negative effect of this ruling is that it will, in effect, force
judicial candidates to announce their views on disputed political and
legal issues. 174 Although some believe that a candidate will not have
to announce his views when his opponent is announcing his own,17 5
such a belief is unrealistic. When one candidate makes such a speech,
interested voters will want the opponent's view as well. If the opponent is asked about his view and the candidate refuses to answer because he is honestly trying to take the "ethical high road," he is likely
to lose votes and ultimately lose the election. 7 6 As a result, Texas's
judiciary and Texas citizens will suffer because the probable betterqualified candidate will not be on the bench.
A similar ramification likely to be seen during judicial campaigns is
an increased influence of special interest groups. 177 One scholar believes that "[t]o get elected, candidates will be pressured by special
interest groups to indicate how they will rule on hot-button issues. "178
This will create a vicious circle: a candidate will, in effect, be forced to
170. See Schotland, supra note 154, at 9.
171. See Baran, supra note 158, at 13.
172. Id. (quoting Bruce Hight, Judge Violated Conduct Code, Panel Decides: Appeals Judge Tom Price Receives Warning for Making Campaign Vow, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 2001, at B1).
173. See id. at 13-14.
174. See Longo, supra note 166, at 2.
175. See Baran, supra note 158, at 14 (suggesting that candidates should state that
they do not think it is appropriate for any judge to make statements on a particular
issue).
176. See Longo, supra note 166, at 7.
177. See id. at 2.
178. Id. (quoting Deborah Goldberg, Deputy Director of the Democracy Program
at the Brennan Center for Justice).
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give his view on an issue so that he can raise money for his campaign
because his opponent has also given his view to raise money from the
big-money special-interest-group contributors.1 7 9 Furthermore, the
large contributing special interest groups will likely take advantage of
candidates that announce their views by paying for mud-slinging commercial advertisements that misrepresent the opponent because the
special interest groups, unlike judicial candidates, are not bound by a
code of conduct.1 i 0 With such unethical tactics in play, the integrity of
the judiciary is further diminished, which further lessens the public's
confidence in its judges. 1
D.

Due Process Ramifications

Further, the White ruling's ramifications will not end when the election ends. Now, there is much concern over the litigant's due process
rights being violated.1 82 The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that citizens have a right to have their cases
heard by fair and impartial courts. 183 The Supreme Court, in a recent
opinion, stated that the due process clause requires that a litigant be
entitled to "an adjudicator who is not in a situation 'which would offer
a possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... which might
lead him to not hold the balance nice, clear, and true."184 Is this really possible with the current political process and its less restrictive
provisions?
The announce clause being struck by the Supreme Court will likely
lead to litigants challenging a court decision on the grounds that the
judge, a state representative, did not provide impartiality in deciding
the case.1 85 Even when the judge does decide the case impartially, the
appearance of impartiality has been destroyed because he has already
given his view during his campaign. 1 86 Further, this may result in
many overturned decisions because findings of actual impartiality or
179. See id. at 2, 7.
180. Champagne, Campaigns, supra note 111 at 20, 20 n.17.
181. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789-90 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. See id. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of
Chief Justices in Support of Respondents at 6, Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002); Schotland, supra note 154 at 11.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 617-18 (1993).
185. See White, 536 U.S. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that a judge "may
be thought to have a 'direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary interest' in ruling
against certain litigants, for she may be voted off the bench and thereby lose her
salary and emoluments unless she honors the pledge that secured her election.") (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Shepard, supra note 129, at 1083-92.
"[A] litigant ought to make a passable case against a sitting judge by asserting that the
judge has a direct, personal interest in ruling in accordance with his [campaign] promise because it is central to his reelection, his personal employment." Id. at 1088.
186. See Shepard, supra note 129, at 1088.
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bias are not required; rather, findings of the possibility that a judge
cannot decide a case impartially are all that is required.1 8 7
Some believe that recusal is the best way to ensure that a litigant's

due process rights are not violated. 88 Justice Kennedy, who joined in

the majority and also wrote a separate concurring opinion, addressed
recusal, stating that a state "may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these
standards.' ' 1 89 However, litigants may not be able to afford the time
and expense of litigating whether a judge should be recused.' 90 Furthermore, recusal is of no help when the litigant is unaware of the
judge's previous campaign statements.' 91 Therefore, the Court's refusal to uphold the announce clause is likely to compromise litigants'
due process rights. 192
VI.

OPTIONS TO REMEDY THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE
WHITE RULING

In light of the White ruling, Texas's ever so lively judicial elections
will likely become even livelier.193 This may cause some, especially
judges, to push for campaign reform, and specifically, to choose a dif94
ferent method in filling the judicial benches throughout the state.'
Several options are available to Texas, and all would require the legislature to respond by placing the proposed method on the election ballot to amend the state's constitution. 95 The first option is to lengthen
the terms that judges serve on the bench.' 96 Second, Texas could follow the majority of states using the electoral process and require that
judicial candidates not run on a partisan ballot.' 97 Third, Texans could
choose from a variety of appointive systems, such as the two generalized groups: the pure appointive system and the merit selection system.' 98 Still another approach that Texas could take is to consider the
role of each judge-whether he is a district court judge or a Texas
187. See Marshall v. Jericho, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
188. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States in
Support of Petitioner at 6, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 1536 U.S. 765 (2002)

(No. 01-521).
189. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. See Shepard, supra note 129, at 1098.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Champagne, Campaigns,supra note 111, at 22.
194. See Phillips, supra note 121, at 12.
195. See Champagne & Cheek, supra note 97, at 930.
196. Symposium, supra note 93, at 340.
197. American Bar Association, Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the
States, at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact-sheet.pdf (Oct. 6, 2003) (on file with
the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
198. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 299.
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Supreme Court justice-and create a specialized selection process
with that role in mind. 199
A.

Term Limits

The first option Texas may wish to select is to retain the judicial
election system but revise the state's constitution by lengthening the
judges' terms in office. 2 °° Currently, justices and judges serving on the
Texas Supreme Court, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and appellate courts serve six-year terms, °1 while county and district judges
serve only four-year terms. 20 2 The state's constitution provides that
three of the nine justices on the Texas Supreme Court are to be
elected every two years.20 3 Likewise, the Court of Criminal Appeals
judges have overlapping terms. 20 4 The purpose of electing three justices every two years rather than having all the candidates elected in
the same year is to ensure there is some stability on the bench and to
prevent the bench from being completely inexperienced.20 5
With overlapping terms, the public elects justices and judges every
two years for the high courts.20 6 By lengthening the terms from six
years to at least twelve years, for example, the public could vote for
high court justices and judges every four years rather than every two
years. This would help the judicial branch in a number of ways. 20 7 It
allows the judges to be more independent and not as concerned with
the public's perception of their decisions because the elections would
not take place as often.20 8 Judges may not be as swayed to rule with
public opinion for fear of not being reelected in the next campaign
because with longer terms and fewer elections, voters are less likely to
remember judges' rulings.20 9 One scholar believes that lengthening
terms will also reduce campaign finance problems and campaign conduct problems. 2 10 Lengthening terms may reduce special interest
group involvement because the "judicial politician" would not be
seeking support and money contributions as often as he does now with
a six-year term.211 Furthermore, lengthening the terms may result in a
more qualified and stabilized group of candidates seeking positions
199. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Adam Long, Selecting PennsylvaniaJudges
in the Twenty-First Century, 106 DICK. L. REV. 747 (2002) (proposing such a process).
200. See Symposium, supra note 93, at 340.
201. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(c), 4(a), 6(b).
202. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 7, 15.
203. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2(c).
204. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 4 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
205. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
206. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(c), 4(a); TEX. CoNsT. art. V, § 4 interp. commentary
(Vernon 1993).
207. See Symposium, supra note 93, at 340-41.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 341.
210. Id.
211. See id.
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because a twelve-year term is likely to be seen as a career move rather
than a political move.21 2
B.

The Nonpartisan Ballot System

A second option for Texans, should they choose to continue to have
judicial elections, is to require judicial candidates to not run on a partisan ballot and to not hold partisan elections.2 1 3 "[I]n those states with
partisan elections, the political parties see judicial elections as part of
an overall political agenda. This has made races for the bench ...
merely a part of the overall partisan electoral warfare. '2 14 Because
partisan elections usually create problems, requiring elections be nonpartisan may help ensure that the more qualified candidate is elected
to the bench rather than the candidate who happened to be on the
winning party label of a highly-popular presidential or gubernatorial
candidate.2 15 In addition, this option may decrease the influence of
special interest groups that make large contributions to political parties and play a major role in expensive attack advertisements.21 6 Nonpartisan elections may be helpful because while it seems that judicial
candidates have fewer and fewer regulations to follow because of the
questioned constitutionality of the rules (as with the announce
clause), special interest groups have absolutely no ethical canons
which they must follow. 2 17 With the White Court holding that a judicial candidate's speech cannot be restricted, most likely, a special interest group or other third party's speech likewise may not be
restricted.21 8 With less involvement by the political parties and/or special interest groups, the courts may regain their integrity.21 9
Although the majority of states that use the electoral system in selecting judges have nonpartisan elections, it is not likely that Texas
will follow because of its deep-seated roots in Texas history. 22 0 Further, such a restriction would probably be challenged and likely found
unconstitutional as well. 22 1 Running on a political ballot is similar to
the announce clause in that "[t]he party label provides a clue to the
attitudes and values of judges and ultimately to how they might decide
212. See id. at 340-41; Schotland, supra note 154, at 11.
213. See Anthony Champagne, PoliticalPartiesand JudicialElections, 34 Lov. L.A.
L. REV. 1411, 1415 (2001) [hereinafter Champagne, Elections].
214. Baran, supra note 158, at 13.
215. See Champagne, Elections, supra note 212, at 1413-15.
216. See id. at 1426.
217. See id.
218. Baran, supra note 158, at 13.
219. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 281.
220. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 97, at 916-20; American Bar Association,
Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, available at http://
www.abanet.org/leadership/fact-sheet.pdf (Oct. 6, 2003) (on file with the Texas WesIeyan Law Review).
221. See Schotland, supra note 154, at 9.
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questions of public policy that are presented in their courts. ' 222 Considering the recent attitude and ruling by the Supreme Court, prohibiting a judicial candidate from "announcing" his political affiliation
during his election is likely an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of
speech.2 2 3
C.

The Pure Appointive System

Another possibility for Texas is to follow the federal government by
eliminating the electoral process altogether and implementing the
pure appointive system. 224 This system would allow the governor to
appoint the judges subject to the advice and consent of the state's senate.2 25 The state judges, like federal judges, would "hold their offices
during good [b]ehaviour. ' '226 In essence, should Texas adopt the pure
appointive system, judges would have life tenure. 2 7 This method ensures that judges are not pressured by politics when making their decisions while sitting on the bench. 2 8 Again, it is difficult to imagine
Texans agreeing to this process, especially given the history of the judicial selection process. 229 Although Texans want judges to be independent and impartial, Texans also want their judges to be
accountable for their actions, and to many, appointing a judge for life
eliminates accountability altogether. 3 °
D. The Merit Appointment System
Implementing the merit appointment selection system, which has
been endorsed by the ABA since the late 1930s, z3 1 is yet another alternative. This process involves "(1) [the] selection of a nonpartisan judicial nominating commission; (2) a list of judicial nominees compiled
by the commission and presented to the appointing authority, who is
usually the governor; and (3) the selection and appointment of a nominee. '23 2 This would eliminate much of the politics because a nonpartisan committee would make the list of nominees.2 33 In addition,
should further checks be desired, a requirement that the governor
could appoint the judges only with the confirmation of the state senate
222. Champagne, Elections, supra note 212, at 1412.
223. See Schotland, supra note 154, at 9-10.
224. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 300.
225. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 300.
226. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
227. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 300.
228. Id.
229. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 97, at 909-10, 929-30.
230. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 305; see also supra Part III.
231. Id. at 301; see James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar
in State JudicialSelection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683,
691 (2002).
232. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 301.
233. See id. at 302.
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could be implemented.2 34 Alternatives also exist as to the length of
the terms and the maximum number of terms to be served.2 3 5 Once
the governor makes the appointment, the judge could serve a life tenure.2 36 Again, considering Texas citizens' need for accountability,2 3 7
the judge could instead be appointed for an initial term for a set number of years, such as twelve years, which would still allow for experience and consistency. 3 8 Also, the system could restrict the number of
terms to only one or require a judge who serves his first term to go
through a retention election or reappointment through the same merit
selection procedure. 239 Retention elections are probably more likely
to be favored in Texas, again, because of the citizens' need for the
judiciary to be held accountable for its decisions.2 4 °
E.

The Specialized Selection Process

A final possibility is to consider each judge's role and create a specialized selection process with that role in mind.2 41 Paul Carrington
and Adam Long have suggested such a system for Pennsylvania.2 42
Following their example, this process appears to be a plausible and
sound consideration for Texas. Carrington and Long's approach requires that judges be separated by the roles they perform.2 4 3 They
suggest that those judges hearing and deciding trials have the "most
direct impact on individual citizens. '2 44 In Texas, both county and district court judges hear and decide trials. Because trial judges do not
make law, Carrington and Long believe that their political views are
not as important as the appellate court justices'.2 45 Because their actions are subject to review by the appellate courts, the appellate process acts as a deterrent to inappropriate conduct.2 46 Thus, the best
method of selecting trial court judges is not by gubernatorial selection
or simply an election by the general public; rather, the suggestion by
Carrington and Long is more appropriate. 4 7
The first step in the Carrington and Long process is to create a nonpartisan commission appointed by both the governor and senate.24 8
Appointments by both branches ensure the commission holds no con234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See id. at 304-05.
See id.
Id. at 304.
See id. at 305.
See id. at 304.
Id.
See id. at 305.
See generally Carrington & Long, supra note 198 (proposing such a process).
See id.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749.
Id.
See id. (suggesting trial judges be selected by a constitutional institution).
See id.
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stituency. 24 9 After the commission makes a selection to fill the county
or district court bench, the nomination goes to the voters in the respective county or district to make the final decision.2 5 ° This "voter
confirmation" is similar to a retention election.2 5 1 The county or district where the judicial prospect is to sit votes on the nomination
before the prospect actually takes the bench.2 52 Unlike the retention
election, however, the judge has not yet served a term.25 3
Because Texans want their judges to be accountable,2 5 4 the term
need not be for life. However, the four-year terms that the county
and district judges serve now appear to be too short for a judge to
demonstrate his qualities.25 5 If the state doubled the term to eight
years, the role of the judicial commission would then be to recommend whether the judge should serve another term of eight years.25 6
That recommendation goes back to the voters to make the final decision, and should the voters reject the commission's nomination, the
commission then seeks another qualified candidate.25 7
Such a system for the trial court judges would make at least two
major changes to the system that is in effect today.25 8 First, the judge
would be recommended by a nonpartisan commission. 259 Because
politics are not playing a role, the judge would be less swayed to rule
on a case in a certain way to ensure a win at the ballot box.2 60 Second,
because the term of office is longer and a commission is making the
recommendation, better-qualified judges will take the bench.2 6 1
Third, Carrington and Long suggest this system is better than the election system because "an initial popular election makes it difficult for
an interest group to launch a televised
personal attack on the candi' 262
date selected by the commission.
A different method is required for the Texas Court of Appeals
bench because appellate justices have different responsibilities than
the county and district court judges. 2 63 Carrington and Long suggest
that the job of the justices of the intermediate appellate courts is not
to make law, but rather to carefully review the trial court record, the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See
See
Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 750.

id.
Behrens & Silverman, supra note 5, at 305.
Carrington & Long, supra note 198, at 750.
id.
id.
id. at 749-50.
id. at 749.
id. at 750.
id.
id.
id. at 750-51.
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law, and legal precedent presented by counsel.2 64 In addition, appellate court decisions may be scrutinized by either the Texas Supreme
Court or the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.2 65 Because of this
"link" to the high courts and the "need for adherence to the ... higher
court[s]," it is suggested that those high courts should decide who
should sit for the intermediate appellate courts.2 6 6 Carrington and
Long reemphasize the point that these judges should be appointed by
the high courts rather than through the electoral process by stating
that "[t]here is little political content to their work . . . [a]nd their
work is . . . invisible" to the electorate and the profession. 267 This
process would eliminate the negative and needless campaigning and
would alleviate judicial candidates from announcing their views on
disputed legal and political issues. 268 Their terms, too, could be
lengthened from six years to eight, could be renewable, or even be
doubled when the judges could only serve one term.2 69
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court and Texas Court of Criminal Appeals justices and judges would require yet another system because
they do not just apply law. 27 ° Rather, they make law as well. 271 Thus,
politics play a role in their bench positions.2 72 Because politics are
involved, the nonpartisan, non-constituency commission should not be
responsible for selecting candidates for the high courts. 273 The bs
best
method for these courts is gubernatorial appointment with a
supermajority senate assent.27 4 This, again, would alleviate the need
for negative campaigns, and it would continue to give Texans the accountability they so greatly need. The accountability would come
from the governor and senators who appoint them to office; should
they select an unqualified judge or appoint a judge who sways too far
from the views of Texans, the people could respond by voting against
the governor and senators in the next election.2 75
In addition to accountability as an important factor for Texans, judicial independence is also a concern. 276 Lengthening judicial terms
from six years to at least fourteen or fifteen years would ensure that
264. Id. at 750.
265. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 5.
266. Carrington & Long, supra note 198, at 751.
267. Id.
268. See id. (stating that voter confirmation should not apply to intermediate appellate courts).
269. See id. (suggesting "[a] much longer [term] if [the judges] were subject to removal by a supermajority of the Supreme Court [and Court of Criminal Appeals]
when [their] members have lost confidence in an individual judge").
270. See id. at 750-52.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 751.
273. Id. at 752.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Symposium, supra note 93, at 345.
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the justices make decisions independently of their political constituents.2 77 Longer terms would almost always ensure no political pressure to decide a certain way because it is likely the justices would not
seek reappointment as a fourteen-year term is likely a career move. 7 8
However, if reappointment was a concern, there could be a provision
limiting the term to only one.27 9 Such a system is logical because it
acknowledges the fact that lower court judges and appellate judges
have different responsibilities.2 8 0 It takes into account that the high
courts do not just apply the law but actually make law as well.2 8'
Lastly, this process allows the people to hold their judges accountable.282 Although there are several options Texas could take, this specialized selection process, with such positive attributes, appears to be
the best road that Texas should take.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Exactly what is the difference between judicial elections and executive or legislative elections in Texas? In recent years, the lines have
become less clear as judicial elections now have special interest group
involvement and major fundraising campaigns.28 3 However, prior to
the White ruling, distinctions remained. 28 4 There remained somewhat
of a sense of independence by the judiciary, and there remained some
judicial impartiality, or at least the appearance of such.28 With the
decision that judicial candidates may announce their views about disputed legal or political issues, the judicial branch is becoming more
like the executive and legislative branch. 2 6 Like the other two
branches, independence and impartiality are no longer the top priorities of the judicial branch. 287 As one scholar has asked, "Do we want
decisions on, say, the First Amendment . . . made by people who are
more like legislators . . .or different from legislators? If judges are
more like legislators, won't that threaten the legitimacy of having the
2' 88
courts review the constitutionality of actions by political branches?
With this recent decision, it is likely that Texas will have "political
judges" determining the constitutional decisions, which may lead Texans to having little or no constitutional protections.2" 9
277. See Carrington & Long, supra note 198, at 752.

278. See id.
279. Id.

280.
281.
282.
283.

See
See
See
See

id. at 750.
id.
id.
Champagne, Campaigns, supra note 111, at 17.

284. See supra Part V.A.

285. See supra Part V.A.
286. See supra Part V.A.

287. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 804 (2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).

288. Schotland, supra note 154, at 11.
289. See id.
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In addition, because little guidance was given by the Supreme Court
as to the ethical provisions now in place, the future of judicial elections is uncertain.2 9 ° Other canons of the Judicial Code of Conduct,
such as the pledges and promises clause, may ultimately be found to
be an unconstitutional restraint on judicial candidates' right to free
speech.2 9 1 With the uncertainty of such rules, the courts and disciplinary boards may determine it is too difficult to regulate the elections,
which will result in free-for-all, mud-slinging judicial campaigns and
elections.2 92 This will ultimately cause the integrity of the courts to
slump to an all-time low.
With such uncertainty, it is time for Texas to make a change. 293 It is
time for the state legislature to respond to the judges who have been
asking for judicial election reform and to revamp the judicial selection
process.2 9 4 It is time to give the judicial branch back its independence
and allow it to act impartially once again. It is time for fairness to play
a significant role in judges' decisions while on the bench. It is time for
Texans to call for a constitutional amendment. It is time for the state
of Texas to make a change.
Angela Allen
290. See supra Part VI.
291. See supra Part V.B.
292. See Marcia Coyle, It Won't Be Long: Supreme Court Took Narrow View in
Ruling on Judicial Candidates Talking on Issues, So Lawsuits Are Expected Soon,
DAILY Bus. REV., July 17, 2002, at A8.
293. See supra Part VI.
294. See supra Part III.C.
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